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Volume I:  Technical Assessment Report 
 
1.0 Notifi cation and Authorization 
A NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) out-of-board assessment was approved on 
October 5, 2006.  Mr. Cornelius Dennehy, NASA Technical Fellow for Guidance, Navigation 
and Control (GN&C) was selected to lead this assessment.  The Assessment Plan was presented 
and approved by the NESC Review Board (NRB) on April 19, 2007.  The Study Kickoff meeting 
was held at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on April 20, 2007. Interim research 
project progress and status reviews were held at MIT in July 2007, in December 2007 and in 
March 2008.  An Initial Summary was presented to the NRB on December 19, 2008.  The Final 
Report was presented for approval to the NRB on October 22, 2009.  
 
The key stakeholders for this assessment are Mr. Frank Bauer, Chief Engineer for the 
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD);  Dr. Brian Muirhead, Constellation Program 
(CxP) Chief System Engineer; Mr. Howard Hu, Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) GN&C 
lead; Mr. Scott Tamblyn, CEV GN&C Engineering; and Mr. William Othon, CEV GN&C 
Engineering.  
 
The NESC, MIT, and Draper Laboratory team performed an independent and systematic study 
on the problem of optimizing the reliability of GN&C architectures with common avionic units.   
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4.0 Executive Summary 
This final report summarizes the results of a comparative assessment of the fault tolerance and 
reliability of different Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) architectural approaches.  
This study was proactively performed by a combined Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) and Draper Laboratory team as a GN&C “Discipline-Advancing” activity sponsored by 
the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC).  This systematic comparative assessment of 
GN&C system architectural approaches was undertaken as a fundamental step towards 
understanding the opportunities for, and limitations of, architecting highly reliable and fault 
tolerant GN&C systems composed of common avionic components.  The primary goal of this 
study was to obtain architectural ‘rules of thumb’ that could positively influence future designs 
in the direction of an optimized (i.e., most reliable and cost-efficient) GN&C system.  A 
secondary goal was to demonstrate the application and the utility of a systematic modeling 
approach that maps the entire possible architecture solution space.  
 
The NESC team implemented a systematic approach for modeling, enumerating, and comparing 
simplified GN&C architectures using basic metrics.  GN&C systems were decomposed into 
simple ‘building block’ subunits of Sensors, Computers, and Actuators, and various forms of 
subunit interconnection were defined for investigation.  The resulting subunit/interconnection 
construct was used as a top-level abstraction for building candidate GN&C system architectures.  
This model was implemented using MIT’s Object Process Network (OPN) modeling language to 
more easily enumerate possible architectures, and ultimately identify which of these architectures 
have optimal properties.  Dual and triple redundant GN&C system architectures, employing 
different reliability classes of components, were modeled using the OPN language.  For the 
purpose of simplicity, it will be assumed that there are only three different types of GN&C 
avionic components possible for each component class.  For example, the model incorporated 
three different types of GN&C Sensor components generically labeled Type A, Type B, and 
Type C, but understood to be representative of a low reliability/lightweight/low accuracy Sun 
Sensor; a medium reliability/medium weight/low-to-medium accuracy star tracker; and a high 
reliability/high weight/high accuracy Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU).  The team assessed the 
avionic components typically used to implement recent space system GN&C architectures.  
Based upon this assessment, the team made a critical modeling assumption that the more reliable 
GN&C components tended to be heavier, more costly, and/or more complex. The team realized 
there are other modeling assumptions that could have been made, such as the GN&C avionic 
component with the smallest part count is a more reliable (and probably lower mass) unit than 
one with a higher part count.  However, that alternate model construct did not fit either the 
team’s desire to keep the model simple and tractable, or the attributes of the GN&C avionic 
component inventory/technology base.     
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For the purposes of this study, reliability is defined as the probability that a given item will 
perform its intended function for a given time under a given set of flight conditions.  This is most 
often expressed in terms of an average or mean life, such as Mean Time Between Failure 
(MTBF).   Individual component reliabilities are dependent upon the component failure rate and 
desired operational time.  The reliability relationships used in the model were exponential and 
governed by the equation R = e -t, where  is the failure rate and t is the operational time.  
Operational time is a user-defined parameter and based on the length of the space exploration 
mission.  An operational time of t = 10 years was assumed in the models developed.  It should be 
noted that the model assumed perfect coverage – 100-percent – accuracy in detecting and 
isolating a failure.  
 
All enumerated architectures were evaluated based on two specific metrics: reliability and 
weight.  In this study, the team elected to assume weight as a surrogate indicator of system cost 
and complexity.  The team acknowledges that in some cases system cost can be driven by the 
complexity factor alone.  However to keep the model simple for this top-level study, the 
assumption made was that weight is a good first-order approximation for system complexity and 
cost. 
 
The team used an interconnection construct as a top-level abstraction for building a preliminary 
model of GN&C system architectures.  This model was implemented using the OPN modeling 
language in order to more easily enumerate possible architectures and ultimately identify which 
architectures have optimal properties.  Partial 2 x 2 systems (i.e., systems with up to dual 
redundancy per component class for two component classes) and 3 x 2 systems (i.e., systems 
with up to triple redundancy per component class for two component classes) were modeled in 
OPN.  Within the constraints of these models, all possible architectures were rigorously 
enumerated and the weight/reliability trade-offs of cross-strapping components and using more 
than one type of component was assessed. 
 
It was found that more reliable components are only beneficial in single string systems, or 
systems with single point failures.  The key finding of this study was that most optimal GN&C 
system architectures employing component redundancy can be produced from generic 
connections and the least reliable type of avionic component from each component class.  The 
analysis of the identified optimal architectures show that it is possible to produce nearly all 
potentially optimal architectures using only the Type A light weight/low-reliability Sensors, 
Type A light weight/low-reliability Computers, and generic connections.  The identified optimal 
architectures reveal a preference to increase GN&C system redundancy of lighter, less reliable 
components rather than using smaller numbers of more reliable, heavy components.  
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The NESC team concluded there is merit in mapping the entire possible system architecture 
solution space.  By showing where similar classes of solutions fall within the entire set, it allows 
one to quantitatively see how certain solution features affect Figure-of-Merit (FOM) 
performance and derive architecture ‘rules of thumb’.   It also allows one to see the optimal 
system architecture solution boundary (the Pareto Front) and understand how one FOM can be 
exchanged for another.  
 
The approach documented in this report provides insight into a potential limitation of the 
‘Minimum Functionality/Minimum Implementation’ system architecting methodology also 
known as the ‘Iterative Risk Driven Design Approach ‘as described in [ref.6] which uses as its 
starting point a single-string non-redundant system architecture.  This method involves 
performing iterative trades to improve system safety until the mass margin is exhausted.  It is not 
apparent that this stepwise optimization of a single design can ever achieve the boundary of 
optimal solutions (the Pareto Front).  Even if it somehow did reach the optimal boundary, it is 
not clear the system architects will have access to and be able to visualize the whole range of 
optimal solutions.  System architects using the ‘Minimum Functionality/Minimum 
Implementation’ approach should be aware of the technique described in this report and consider 
using it for comparison. 
 
The team also concluded that with some enhancements, the systematic GN&C/Avionics 
“building block” OPN modeling techniques employed would serve as an excellent tool for 
evaluating competing GN&C system architectures for future spacecraft.  This OPN-based 
approach, or other similar modeling tools, would perform the extremely useful up-front function 
of identifying the most attractive (lowest weight and overall “cost”) GN&C architectural options 
that satisfy a prescribed set of spacecraft fault tolerance, reliability, and performance 
requirements.  Although less likely, but worth observing, is that such “building block” models 
could be used to identify the optimal (highest reliability/lowest weight) architectural options for 
a prescribed number and configuration of connections between adjacent GN&C components.  
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5.0 Ass essment Plan 
5.1  Background 
Historically, the United States (US) human spaceflight programs have had thorough GN&C 
analysis and design early in their lifecycles, evaluating various GN&C architectural concepts 
within the trade space of their individual mission goals, constraints, and risk postures.  The 
selected GN&C architectures have been tailored for each program, which is not surprising given 
the very different mission concepts.  The Constellation Program (CxP) will be no different, but 
top level program requirements drivers for reliability and affordability may flow down to 
influence GN&C architectural considerations, such as fault tolerance, in ways never before 
encountered in the US space program. 
 
Accomplishing the objectives of the CxP requires reliable GN&C for multiple spacecraft, both 
crewed and robotic.  The up-front “architecting-in” of reliability is an integral part of the early 
steps of the GN&C Systems Engineering process.  Substandard architectures may not only be 
unreliable but are typically difficult to fabricate, test, operate, support, service, and upgrade. 
These architectures can also be prohibitively costly to adapt to evolving mission scenarios as the 
system lifecycle extends beyond the anticipated time frame of service.   
 
The operators of systems with substandard architectures can have protracted development 
schedules and high recurring operational costs as a result of not fully informed design decisions 
made early in a project’s development cycle.  Therefore, it was important that a major system 
development project not prematurely shift its focus to the challenges of implementation before 
fully defining the appropriate architecture.  There is benefit to allocating the time and devoting 
sufficient attention to defining the optimum system architecture over the lifecycle by producing 
the maximum return for a given level of risk and resources.  
 
With some of these considerations in mind a comparative assessment activity focused on 
investigating the fault tolerance and reliability trades between different GN&C architectural 
approaches was formulated by the NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C.  This led to a proactive 
study being performed by a combined MIT and Draper Laboratory team as a GN&C “Discipline-
Advancing” activity sponsored by the NESC.  The motivation for performing this study was the 
observation, both on the part of NESC and MIT, that GN&C systems for exploration 
prominently stand out among all the future spacecraft systems, as a potential “sweet spot” area 
where having flight hardware commonality might be of greatest benefit.  This systematic 
comparative assessment of GN&C system architectural approaches was undertaken as a 
fundamental step towards understanding the opportunities for and limitations of architecting 
highly reliable and fault tolerant GN&C systems composed of common GN&C avionic 
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components.  The primary goal of this study was to obtain architectural ‘rules of thumb’ which 
could positively influence and drive future designs in the direction of the most reliable and cost-
efficient GN&C systems possible. A secondary goal was to demonstrate the application and 
utility of a systematic modeling approach that maps the entire possible architecture solution 
space.  
5.2  Scope 
The proposed work was a systematic GN&C architecture comparative study performed by an 
integrated MIT/Draper Laboratory study team under the leadership of Dr. Edward Crawley of the 
MIT Aeronautics and Astronautics Engineering Department.   
 
This study leveraged analytical methods developed at MIT as part of their program in Technical 
System Architecture, and their specialized analysis tools/methods used to support the NASA 
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Concept Exploration and Refinement 
(CE&R) study.  The MIT tools and methods were extended and applied to the problem of 
optimum GN&C system architectures.  The existing MIT systematic architecture analysis 
capability, under Dr. Edward Crawley, was used to execute this task.  Dr. Steven Hall, formerly 
of the Draper Laboratory, actively participated in this assessment as the Co-Lead and as the 
principal researcher on the assessment and evaluation of reliable GN&C avionic architectures. 
 
MIT’s capabilities in system architecting methods were grounded in long-term research studies 
and benchmarking of best practice in space, automotive, electronics, and oil exploration 
industries.  Historical work included methods developed in support of NASA’s Advanced 
Planning and Integration office, the creation and continuous refinement of a graduate-level class 
in Technical System Architecture, and through participation in multiple previous studies 
supporting NASA’s ESMD.   
 
6.0 Problem Description, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment 
6.1 Description of the Problem 
Sensors, Computers, and Actuators will be defined as “component classes”.  The terminology “I 
x J OPN model” will be used to describe a model with up to “I” redundancy per component class 
and up to “J” component classes.  For example, J = 2 could designate a model which only has 
Sensors or which has Sensors and Computers.  J = 3 could designate a model with: Sensors; 
Sensors and Computers; or Sensors, Computers, and Actuators.  If J = 3 and I = 2, this could 
designate a system with up to 2 Sensors, 2 Computers, and 2 Actuators.  This paper will discuss 
the OPN 2 x 2 and 3 x 2 models and their applicability to a 3 x 3 model. 
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For the purpose of simplicity, it will be assumed that there are only three different types of 
components possible for each component class.  In reality, three Sensor Types might include a 
Sun Sensor, star tracker, and an IMU.  However, to be more generic, Types will instead be 
referred to as Type A, Type B, and Type C. 
 
As a first pass, all enumerated architectures were evaluated based on two specific metrics: 
reliability and weight.  In this study, the team elected to use weight as a surrogate indicator of 
system cost and complexity. The team did observe and understand that in some cases system cost 
can be driven by the complexity factor alone. However to keep the model simple for this top-
level study the assumption made was that weight is a good first order approximation for system 
complexity and cost. 
 
7.0  Data Analysis 
Section 7.1 will discuss the design of the simple 2 x 2 model, Section 7.2 will give further details 
on the model, and Section 7.3 will discuss the design of the more complicated 3 x 2 model.  
Section 7.4 will examine the application of reliability and weight metrics to the enumerated 
architectures.  Finally, Section 7.5 will provide some general concluding remarks.  
 
7.1 The 2 x 2 GN&C System 
This section begins the discussion of the design of the 2 x 2 model.  Even with just four 
components (2 Sensors and 2 Computers), numerous architectures can be defined for a 2 x 2 
system based on how the components are inter-connected.  Each of these architectures will have 
different total weight and reliability. 
 
 
Figure 7.1-1. Three Possible 2 x 2 Systems 
 
Figure 7.1-1 depicts three possible 2 x 2 architectures. The reliability, R, of the three models is 
shown in Table 7-1.1, where sj is the reliability of Sensor j, and ck is the reliability of  
Computer k. 
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Table 7.1-1. Reliability Expressions for the 2 x 2 Systems in Figure 7.1-1 
Architecture Reliability 
Channelized R = s1c1 + s2c2 – s1c1s2c2 
Hybrid 
R = s1c1 + s2c1 + s2c2 – s2c1c2 – s1s2c1 – 
s1s2c1c2 + s1s2c1c2 
Cross-Strapped 
R = s1c1 + s1c2 – s1c1c2 + s2c1 + s2c2 – s2c1c2 – 
s1s2c1 – 2s1s2c1c2 + 2s1s2c1c2 – s1s2c2 + 
2s1s2c1c2 – s1s2c1c2 
 
It is important to note that no matter what the architecture, the reliability of any 2 x 2 model can 
be generated by taking the cross-strapped expression for R and then eliminating terms from the 
expression for connections which do not exist and therefore do not contribute to system 
reliability.  Additional indicator variables are added to the cross-strapped reliability expression to 
specify which terms to eliminate.  These indicator variables were correlated with the 
interconnections between components.  A nonzero indicator variable represented a connection, 
whereas an indicator variable equal to zero represents a missing connection. 
 
Using the methodology described, the following general expression for R is obtained: 
R = s1i11c1 + s1i12c2 – s1i11i12c1c2 + s2i21c1 + s2i22c2 – s2i21i22c1c2 – s1s2i11i21c1 – 
s1s2i11i22c1c2 – s1s2i12i21c1c2 + s1s2i11i12i21c1c2 + s1s2i11i21i22c1c2 – s1s2i12i22c2 + 
s1s2i11i12i22c1c2 + s1s2i12i21i22c1c2 – s1s2i11i12i21i22c1c2 
Where ijk is the reliability of the connection between Sensor j and Computer k, if such a 
connection exists and 0 otherwise. 
 
As a sanity check, the reliability expressions for the channelized and hybrid architectures can be 
derived from the general expression.  Assuming perfect connection reliability (i.e., ijk = 1 for all 
connections in the architecture) the channelized and hybrid architectures would be represented 
by the indicator variables in Table 7.1-2.  Plugging these indicator variables into the general 
expression gives the same reliability expressions in Table 7.1-1.  
Table 7.1-2. Indicator for the Channelized and Hybrid 2 x 2 Systems in Figure 7.1-1 
Architecture i 11 i12 i21 i22 
Channelized 1 0 0 1 
Hybrid 1 0 1 1 
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7.2  Details on the 2 x 2 OPN Model 
Like the previously mentioned 3 x 2 and 3 x 3 models, the 2 x 2 OPN model was viewed as a 
sophisticated Petri net model.  In a Petri net model, information-storing tokens move via directed 
arcs from transitions to and from places to transitions.  Note that there may be more than one 
directed arc feeding from or to a transition or place.  Upon arrival at a transition a token is 
consumed and then processing is completed, and, if appropriate, new tokens were introduced in 
the places dictated by the directed arcs leading from the transition. 
 
The sequence of transitions in any of the discussed OPN models is a sequence of decision points.  
At each decision point, a token is replicated with multiplicity equal to the number of possible 
decisions.  The information stored in each token represents a unique possible architecture.  Taken 
together, the tokens enumerate all possible architectures given an initial set of constraints.  All 
tokens are collected when they completely propagate through the model for analysis. 
 
Figure 7.2-1 is a visual representation of the OPN decision tree for the 2 x 2 model and the 
following questions are the decision points: 
 How many Sensors? 
 1 or 2 
 Type assignment for Sensors? 
 If only one Sensor, then choose Sensor A, Sensor B, or Sensor C 
 If two Sensors, then choose two of the same Type of Sensor or one of each of two 
Types (i.e., the possible combinations would be: AA, AB, AC, BB, BC, and CC) 
 How many Computers? 
 1 or 2 
 Type assignment for Computers? 
 If only one Computer, then choose Computer A, Computer B, or Computer C 
 If two Computers, then choose two of the same Type of Computer or one of each 
of two Types (i.e., the possible combinations would be: AA, AB, AC, BB, BC, 
and CC) 
 Which Sensors are connected to Computer 1? 
 Just Sensor 1 
 Just Sensor 2 (if Sensor 2 exists) 
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 Both Sensor 1 and 2 (if Sensor 2 exists) 
 If Computer 2 exists, which Sensors are connected to Computer 2? 
 Just Sensor 1 
 Just Sensor 2 (if it Sensor 2 exists) 
 Both Sensor 1 and 2 (if Sensor 2 exists) 
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Figure 7.2-1. 2 x 2 OPN Decision Tree 
 
During the process of token propagation, the number of components, component types, and 
connections were continuously updated for later use in reliability calculations.  In addition, the 
current weight of the system was updated at execution time.  Each component type was given its 
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Connections to Computer 1
Type assignment for 1 computer
Type assignment for 2 sensors
How many computers?
Type assignment for 2 computers
Type assignment for 1 sensor
How many sensors?
__init_state
1 sensor
__init_proc
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Sensor Type C
Sensor Type B
Computer Type A
Sensor 2 connected to Computer 1
Sensors 1 and 2 connected to Computer 1
Sensor 1 connected to Computer 1
Sensor 2 connected to Computer 2
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Computer Type B
Computer Type C
1 computer
Sensor Types AA
Sensor Types AB
2 sensor
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Sensor Types BC
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own unique reliability and weight based on the specific make and model of the component.  
These values were based on real components, but modified slightly to facilitate analysis. 
Reliabilities are dependent upon the failure rate of the component and the desired operational 
time for the component.  The relationship is governed by the equation R = e -t, where  is the 
failure rate and t is the operational time.  Operational time is user defined and based on the 
length of the proposed mission.  An operational time of t = 10 years was used in the models 
discussed in this paper.  Other component properties are illustrated in Table 7.2-1 and Table  
7.2-2. 
Table 7.2-1. Component Properties For Sensor Types A, B, and C 
Sensor Type A B C 
Failure Rate,  (/year) 0.00015 0.00 01 0.00005 
Reliability, R 0.9985 0.999 0.9995 
Weight (dimensionless) 3 6 9 
 
Table 7.2-2. Component Properties For Computer Types A, B, and C 
Computer Type A B C 
Failure Rate,  (/year) 0.0001 0.00 004 0.00002 
Reliability, R 0.999 0.9996 0.9998 
Weight (dimensionless) 3 5 10 
 
Two additional weights and one reliability were also included in the model.  A “connection 
weight” and a “dissimilar component penalty” were included to ensure that weight continues to 
approximate complexity and cost.  Cross-strapping components may not add significant weight 
to the overall system, but adds to the system complexity and cost.  Similarly, dealing with more 
than one Type of Sensor and/or Computer also increases complexity and cost.  Hence, adding 
these additional weights where appropriate worked as a first step toward simulating an 
operational system. 
 
The weights associated with connections and dissimilar components were chosen to be consistent 
with the weights of Sensors and Computers.  To do so, assumptions were made and the 
connections were considered to be, at most, 1/3 of the complexity of the average Computer.  In 
addition, the weight penalty for dissimilar components was set such that it was not larger than 
the heaviest Sensor or Computer. 
 
These assumptions dictated a certain range of weight values used for connections and dissimilar 
component parameters.  However, rather than presuppose exact values for these weights, 
multiple OPN runs were executed varying one of the parameters each time.  Assuming the 
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connection reliability would be greater than that of a Computer, the nine OPN scenarios are 
illustrated in Table 7.2-3. 
Table 7.2-3. Connection Reliabilities, Connection Weights, and Dissimilar Component Penalties for 
Each OPN Scenario Run 
OPN Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Connection 
Reliability 
1 1 1 0.99995 0.99995 0.99995 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 
Connection 
Weight 
(dimensionless) 
0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 5 / 3 5 / 3 5 / 3 
Dissimilar 
Component 
Penalty 
(dimensionless) 
0 6 9 0 6 9 0 6 9 
 
7.3 Details on the 3 x 2 OPN Model 
Implementation of the 3 x 2 OPN model is similar to that of the 2 x 2 model with two notable 
exceptions.  These exceptions relate to the overall system reliability formula and the removal of 
duplicate architectures to minimize the computer memory required to run the model. The 
reliability formula was more complicated for the larger models and was handled differently.  
Although reliability is calculated after the OPN completes execution, it can no longer be easily 
manually calculated for implementation in Microsoft® Excel®.  Instead, symbolic MATLAB® 
was used to calculate the formula and a MATLAB® script was used to insert the correct “i” 
indicator values where appropriate.  Only after this manipulation was performed could the 
reliability values be imported into Excel® for implementation. 
 
In addition, care had to be taken to ensure no architecture was represented more than once in the 
model.  Running a larger 3 x 2 OPN model would take an inordinate amount of time and 
computer memory.  It was found that certain architectures could be represented in multiple 
configurations and this was not taken into account by the 2 x 2 model1.  By producing tokens for 
all possible configurations of the same architecture, the model required significantly longer run 
times and used substantial memory. 
 
                                                 
1 The 2 x 2 model is smaller than the 3 x 2 model.  As a result, there were no memory issues and duplicate 
architectures were removed in post-processing (i.e., they did not have to be removed in OPN). 
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An example of duplicate architecture is shown in Figure 7.3-1.  A1 and A2 represent the same 
architecture, in both cases one Sensor of Type A is connected to a Computer of Type A, the other 
Sensor A is connected to a Computer A and a Computer B, and a Sensor of Type B is connected 
to a Computer of Type C.  A3 represents a different architecture, however, since both Sensors of 
Type A are connected to a Computer of Type B. 
 
 
Figure 7.3-1. Determination of Duplicate Architectures 
 
The process of eliminating duplicate architectures began by choosing a representative set of 
Sensor Types and Computer Types.  Ten possibilities were chosen as representative orderings of 
the three Sensor Types and also the three Computer Types: AAA, AAB, AAC, ABB, ACC, 
ABC, BBB, BBC, BCC, and CCC.   
 
A1 in Figure 7.3-1 represents a connection pattern between three adjacent components.  This 
connection pattern has four connections: Sensor 1 to Computer 1, Sensor 2 to both Computer 1 
and Computer 2, and Sensor 3 to Computer 3.  Keeping this connection pattern fixed, the team 
gave a “Type” identity to the three Sensors based on the 10 possible orderings.  For each possible 
ordering of the Sensor Types, there were 10 possible orderings of the Computer Types, each of 
which defines a unique architecture.  In other words, for any given connection pattern such as 
A1, there are 10 x 10 = 100 possible architectures.  The OPN model iterates through all possible 
connection patterns and finds all 100 possible architectures. 
 
Note that orderings such as ABA and BAA are not taken to be representative orderings.  When 
all possible connection patterns are taken into account, these additional orderings will fail to 
produce any architecture that cannot be produced by AAB.  This is because ABA, BAA, and 
AAB are equivalent (i.e., all represent two components of Type A and one of Type B).  It does 
not matter in what order the Types are described as long as the case is represented. 
 
Searching for duplicate architectures in the OPN does not require checking 100 possible 
architectures for each connection pattern.  The 100 possibilities for each connection pattern can 
be represented by 16 representative architectures.  As illustrated in Figure 7.3-2, the 10 Sensor 
Type combinations and the 10 Computer Type combinations can be abstracted to just four 
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representative combinations per component.  First, AAA, BBB, and CCC represent the case 
where all three components are of the same type.  Next, AAB, AAC, and BBC represent the case 
where the first two components were of the same Type and the third component was of a 
different Type.  Furthermore, ABB, ACC, and BCC represent the case where the second and 
third components are of the same Type, but the first component is of a different Type.  Finally, 
ABC represents the case where all three components were of a different Type. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3-2. Finding Representative Architectures 
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Figure 7.3-3 helps demonstrate why these representative architectures work for finding duplicate 
architectures.  To use representative architectures to find duplicates is to claim that if architecture 
A1 is equivalent to architecture A2, but not A3, then architecture B1 is equivalent to B2, but not 
B3.
Figure 7.3-3. Using Representative Architectures to Find Duplicates 
As previously discussed, A1 and A2 represent the same architecture even though they have 
different connection patterns.  It is arbitrary which form of architecture is chosen as the primary 
form and which is a duplicate (i.e., either A1 or A2 could be considered the duplicate). 
The study team implemented duplicate detection into the model, which was an involved manual 
process.  The assessment had a finite schedule allocation and the development time necessary for 
automating the duplicate detection process was uncertain.  It was therefore decided that a manual 
(i.e., brute force) method should be used to implement duplicate detection.  All possible 
representative architectures were manually drawn and duplicate architectures were identified.  In 
all, over 100 pages of architectures were drawn and compared. An example of manually drawn
architectures is shown in Figure 7.3-4. 
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Figure 7.3-4. Example of Manually-Drawn Architectures 
 
Based on the circled representative architectures, rules were created and inserted into the OPN to 
keep any tokens that will produce duplicate architectures from propagating.  Note that all rules 
are in the form of Boolean expressions starting with “not if” instead of “if”.  Although all work 
was double-checked, it is conceivable that an incorrect rule was entered due to human error.  By 
using “not if” instead of “if”, the default is to pass the token.  It was assessed that it is better to 
retain a duplicate architecture rather than exclude a potentially optimal architecture. 
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The Boolean rules are inserted into the OPN model on the transitions from: 
 Which Sensors are connected to Computer 1? 
 If Computer 2 exists, which Sensors are connected to Computer 2? 
 If Computer 3 exists, which Sensors are connected to Computer 3? 
 
To the places: 
 Just Sensor 1 
 Just Sensor 2 (if Sensor 2 exists) 
 Just Sensor 3 (if Sensor 3 exists) 
 Just Sensors 1 and 2 (if Sensor 2 exists) 
 Just Sensors 1 and 3 (if Sensor 3 exists) 
 Just Sensors 2 and 3 (if Sensor 3 exists) 
 Sensors 1, 2, and 3 (if Sensor 3 exists) 
 
Trivial rules govern which Sensors are connected to Computer 1.  If a particular token represents 
an architecture with only two Sensors, it is not possible to make a connection to a Computer 
from a nonexistent Sensor 3.  Therefore, in the two Sensor case, no new tokens are introduced 
into the places representing, “just Sensor 3”, “just Sensors 1 and 3”, “just Sensors 2 and 3”, or 
“Sensors 1, 2, and 3”.  Similarly, if a particular token represents an architecture with only one 
Sensor, no new tokens are introduced into the places representing, “just Sensor 2”, “just Sensor 
3”, “just Sensors 1 and 2”, “just Sensors 1 and 3”, “just Sensors 2 and 3”, or “Sensors 1, 2,  
and 3”. 
 
Rules governing connections to Computer 2 and 3 are more complicated.  If a token represents 
an architecture with only two Computers, the final system architecture will be evident after 
creating the Sensor connections to the second Computer.  If a token represents an architecture 
with three Computers, it is known that there will be a final system architecture after creating the 
Sensor connections to the third Computer.  Connections that will form duplicate (circled) 
architectures should not be allowed to propagate.  Hence rules are followed to block introduction 
of these tokens. 
 
Figure 7.3-5 shows an example of a rule based on a manually drawn architecture.  This rule 
determines whether a connection should be made between Sensor 3 and Computer 3.  Note that, 
by the time a token reaches the given rule, the connections between Sensor 1 and Computer 2, 
and between Sensor 2 and Computer 1 have already been defined.  No connection should be 
made if the type definitions for the Sensors and Computers match those represented by the 
circled architectures (i.e., such tokens will result in the formation of duplicate architectures).   
In other words, the connection between Sensor 3 and Computer 3 should not be made if Sensor 
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1’s Type is the same as Sensor 2’s Type, or Computer 1’s Type is the same as Computer 2’s 
Type. 
 
 
 
!(Computer Redundancy < 3) && 
!(Sensor Redundancy < 3) && 
!( 
(i11 == 0 && i12 == 0) || 
(Sensor Redundancy > 1 && i21 == 0 && i22 == 0) || 
  ( 
(i11 == 0 && i12 > 0 && i21 > 0 && i22 == 0 && i31 == 
0 && i32 == 0) && 
( 
(Sensor1_Type == Sensor2_Type) || 
(Computer1_Type == Computer2_Type) 
    ) 
 ) 
) 
Figure 7.3-5. Example of Rule Based on a Manually Drawn Architecture 
 
Eliminating duplicate architectures in the 3 x 2 OPN model significantly reduced the number of 
tokens produced from 51,902 to 9,795 tokens. 
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7.4  Results 
Despite eliminating the unnecessary duplicate architectures from the model, attempts to run a  
3 x 3 model still resulted in a memory shortage.  Although it is unfortunate that the larger OPN 
model could not be completed, it is important to note that results from the 3 x 2 model can be 
applied to the 3 x 3 case. 
 
By taking a top-level view of a GN&C system, the interaction between adjacent Sensor and 
Computer components is identical to the interaction between adjacent Computer and Actuator 
components.  Similar to the Sensors and Computers, there are different Types of Actuators, each 
with a unique set of properties.  A system architect will be able to choose different redundancies 
for each of these Types.  Furthermore, the connection patterns already found between Sensors 
and Computers are the same as those between Computers and Actuators.  Finally, the metrics of 
weight and reliability can be calculated in the same way. 
 
There were nine scenarios outlined in this section, each scenario was run and Pareto plots were 
produced for each.  Representative plots for the nine scenarios are reproduced in Figures 7.4-1 
through 7.4-4.  In each scenario, the architectures that simultaneously had both lowest weight 
and highest reliability were identified.  These architectures are “on the Pareto front.”  The 
identified Pareto- architectures were found by zooming in on the “utopia point” at the lower right 
hand corner of the plot2.  Note that in most cases, there are multiple identified architectures for 
each scenario since it is somewhat subjective which architectures are closer to the utopia point.  
For example: Is an architecture with weight = 17 and reliability = 0.999999596912468 (six “9”s) 
better than an architecture with weight = 18 and reliability = 0.999999995634079 (eight “9”s)?   
 
The answers to such questions are made clear in the mission requirements context.  For a human-
rated mission, perhaps a reliability of 0.9999999 (seven “9”s) is required for safety.  If this were 
the case, the architecture with weight = 18 would be better, since the architecture with weight = 
17 does not meet the seven “9”s requirement of this example. 
 
In the zoomed out (top) plot of each of the nine scenarios, there appear to be six clusters of 
architecture data points.  The architectures in each cluster have nearly identical reliabilities.  
Looking from left to right, the first five clusters (i.e., the five clusters with the lowest reliability) 
are driven by single point failures of any of the six component Types.  For example, in an 
architecture that contains one Sensor and two Computers, or an architecture that contains one 
Sensor and three Computers, the single Sensor present in the architecture must remain viable in 
order for the overall system to remain reliable.  Sensor Type A has a reliability of 0.9985.  
                                                 
2 The utopia point represents the ideal architecture which is 100 percent reliable with weight = 0. 
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Therefore, a one-Sensor two-Computer or one-Sensor three-Computer architecture that contains 
Sensor A can have a maximum reliability of 0.9985.  Architectures that have a single point 
failure at Sensor A, define the first (least reliable) cluster of data points.  Both Sensor Type B 
and Computer Type A have the same reliability of 0.999.  Therefore, architectures that have a 
single point failure at a Sensor of Type B, or a single point failure at a Computer of Type A, will 
fall into the second cluster.  Similarly, Sensor Type C’s reliability of 0.9995 defines the third 
cluster, Computer Type B’s reliability of 0.9996 defines the fourth cluster, and Computer Type 
C’s reliability of 0.9998 defines the fifth cluster. 
The sixth and final (most reliable) cluster contains all other architectures (i.e., architectures free 
from single point failures).  The additional points that do not fall into any of the six clusters are 
single-string architectures (i.e., architectures that contain one Sensor and one Computer).  These 
architectures contain not one, but two single point failures and are therefore significantly less 
reliable than an identical architecture with additional Computers or additional Sensors. 
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Figure 7.4-1. Architecture Pareto Plots 
Note:  (Top) Pareto plot with added details for number of connections between Sensors and Computers, (Middle) 
zoomed in version of the same plot, (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) 
Architecture 1 has weight = 12 and reliability = 0.9999967, architecture 2 has weight = 15 and reliability = 
0.9999989, architecture 3 has weight = 17 and reliability = 0.99999959, and architecture 4 has weight = 18 and 
reliability = 0.9999999956
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Figure 7.4-2. Architecture Pareto Plots  
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Figure 7.4-2. Concluded
Note:  (Top) Pareto plot with added details for both number of Sensors and number of Computers, (Middle) zoomed 
in version of the same plot, (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) 
Architecture 1 has weight = 12 and reliability = 0.99999675437371, architecture 2 has weight = 15 and reliability = 
0.999998997632005, and architecture 3 has weight = 18 and reliability = 0.999999995634079 
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Figure 7.4-3. Architecture Pareto Plots  
 
Note:  (Top) Pareto Plot with Added Details for Both Number and Types of Computers, (Middle) Zoomed in version 
of the same plot, (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has 
weight = 14 and reliability = 0.999996754062388, architecture 2 has weight = 17 and reliability = 
0.999998992620742, architecture 3 has weight = 19 and reliability = 0.999999593334442, and architecture 4 has 
weight = 19.5 and reliability = 0.999999983481890 
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Figure 7.4-4. Architecture Pareto Plots  
 
Note:  (Top) Pareto plot with added details for both number and Types of Sensors, (Middle) zoomed in version of 
the same plot, (Bottom) Potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has 
weight = 15.333 and reliability = 0.999993257523472, architecture 2 has weight = 17 and reliability = 
0.99999501059889, architecture 3 has weight = 18.667 and reliability = 0.999996753726173, architecture 4 has 
weight = 20 and reliability = 0.999997398039817, architecture 5 has weight = 21.667 and reliability = 
0.999998992071849, and architecture 6 has weight = 23 and reliability = 0.999999983481890 
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The ideal case would be that there is no penalty for connection weight or using dissimilar 
components, which can be seen in Figure 7.4-1.  In this scenario, all identified architectures are 
fully cross-strapped.  This is to be expected since additional connections increase reliability yet 
cost nothing.  Figure 7.4-1 also demonstrates that the weight of an architecture’s component 
plays a major role in determining the optimality of the architecture.  Recall that components of 
Type A are the lightest and least reliable, and that components of Type C are the heaviest and 
most reliable.  Even though components of Type A is the least reliable, Sensors of Type A and 
Computers of Type A are by far the most prevalent component Types in all the optimal 
architectures.  In addition, although components of Type C are the most reliable, no components 
of this type appear in any of the optimal architectures.  Furthermore, there were no Sensors of 
Type B in the optimal architectures.  Architecture three contains a Computer of Type B, but this 
architecture is no longer optimal once the “dissimilar components penalty” is increased from 
penalty = 0 to penalty = 6 (see Figure 7.4-2).  Since the optimal architectures for penalty = 6 
contain no dissimilar components, increasing the penalty to = 9 results in no further changes to 
the optimal architectures. 
 
Figure 7.4-3 provides a baseline for what can be considered a realistic system.  In this scenario, 
there are no longer perfect connection reliabilities of 100 percent and there is a cost for 
producing connections (i.e., connection reliability = 0.99995 and connection weight = 0.5).  As a 
result of the 0.5 connection weight, only one fully cross-strapped architecture (Architecture 1) is 
among the optimal architectures.  The other optimal architectures have 3 or 4 connections.  
Among these, Architectures 2 and 3 are the most interesting.  Each has three Sensors and two 
Computers with two of the Sensors having one connection to a Computer and the last having two 
connections. 
 
The scenario in which connection weight = 0.5 is similar with the connection weight = 0 
scenario.  Once again, the component types in the optimal architectures are predominantly of 
Type A and never of Type C.  Only one optimal architecture (Architecture 3) contains a 
component of Type B (Computer).  This architecture is not optimal when the dissimilar 
components penalty is increased to penalty = 6.  There is no change in optimal architectures for 
connection weight = 0.5 when this penalty is increased from penalty = 6 to = 9. 
 
Figure 7.4-4 depicts the first scenario where connection reliability = 0.9999 and connection 
weight = 5/3.  This scenario produces similar optimal architectures to the connection weight = 
0.5 scenario, but with notable exceptions. 
 
Even with the dissimilar components penalty set to penalty = 0, connection weight = 5/3 is 
sufficiently high as to eliminate any architecture that contains a component type heavier than 
  
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
06-074 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for  
Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft  
Page #: 
34 of 88 
 
NESC Request No.:06-074-I 
 
Type A.  This means that Architecture 3 from Figure 7.4-3 is the only connection weight = 0.5 
architecture which contains a component of Type B, and is not an optimal architecture for 
connection weight = 5/3.  This also means that the optimal architectures for connection weight = 
5/3 will not change if the dissimilar components penalty is increased to penalty = 6 or = 9.  
 
A connection weight of 5/3 makes it more desirable to have architectures with fewer 
connections.  Although Architectures 1, 2, and 4 from Figure 7.4-3 are still optimal architectures 
when the connection weight is increased to 5/3, the value of these architectures was diminished 
with the heavier connection weight.  As a result, these architectures are no longer closer to the 
utopia point than Architectures 1, 2, and 4 from Figure 7.4-4. 
 
The six potentially optimal architectures for connection weight = 5/3 produce an interesting set.  
All legal architectures with four or fewer connections that contain two to three Sensors of Type 
A and two Computers of Type A are optimal architectures for this scenario.  In effect, a system 
architect is directly trading an increase in weight for additional reliability when connection 
weight = 5/3. 
 
By reviewing a subset of the possible architectures, specifically a subset in which all members 
have the same number of connections, the effect of the dissimilar components penalty on the 
optimal architectures is nearly identical to the penalty’s effect on the optimal architectures of the 
superset.  Figures 7.4-5 and 7.4-6 depict the optimal architectures for 3 x 2 systems with 
1through 9 connections when the connection reliability equals one and connection weight equals 
zero.  The reliabilities and weights for these architectures can be found in Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-2.  
Again, as the penalty is increased from penalty = 0 to  6, nearly all architectures containing 
Sensor Type B or Computer Type B cease to be optimal.  For architectures with the same 
number of connections, the same architectures which are optimal for penalty = 0 will be optimal 
no matter what the connection weight.  Similarly, architectures which are optimal for penalty = 6 
or9 remained optimal no matter what the connection weight.  Although the overall system weight 
of any subset member will change if the connection weight is modified, this change will be 
identical to the transformation seen by any of the other systems in this subset.  This is because all 
systems in each subset have, by definition, the same number of connections.  Therefore, among 
architectures with the same number of connections, the architectures closest to the utopia point 
will remain closest to the utopia point regardless of the change to the connection weight. 
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Table 7.4-1. Reliabilities and Weights for the 1- through 9- Connection Architectures Closest the 
Utopia Point 
Note: Assuming a 3 X 2 System with Connection Reliability = 1, Connection Weight = 0, and No Penalty for 
Dissimilar Components 
 
Connections Reliability Weight On Pareto front? 
1 0.99 9100405 14  
 0.99 9300245 19  
2 0.99 9993766 12  
 0.99 9995260 14  
 0.99 9996397 16  
 0.99 9997344 19  
 0.99 9997754 20  
 0.99 9998292 22  
 0.99 9998741 25  
3 0.99 9995260 12  
 0.99 9996756 14  
 0.99 9997499 15  
 0.99 9998996 17  
 0.99 9999984 18  
4 0.99 9996754 12 Yes 
 0.99 9998993 15  
 0.99 9999594 17  
 0.99 9999988 18  
5 0.99 9998995 15  
 0.99 9999596 17  
 0.99 9999992 18  
6 0.99 9998998 15 Yes 
 0.99 9999597 17 Yes 
 0.99 9999996 18  
7 0.99 9999994 18  
8 0.99 9999996 18  
9 0.99 9999996 18 Yes 
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Figure 7.4-5. Architectures Described in Table 7.4-1
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Table 7.4-2. Reliabilities and Weights for the 1- through 9- Connection Architectures Closest the 
Utopia Point  
Note: Assuming a 3 X 2 System with Connection Reliability = 1, Connection Weight = 0, and Penalty = 6 for 
Dissimilar Components 
Connections Relia bility Weight On Pareto front? 
1 0 .999100405 14  
 0 .999300245 19  
2 0 .999993766 12  
 0 .999996397 16  
3 0 .999995260 12  
 0 .999997499 15  
 0 .999999984 18  
4 0 .999996754 12 Yes 
 0 .999998993 15  
 0 .999999988 18  
5 0 .999998995 15  
 0 .999999992 18  
6 0 .999998998 15 Yes 
 0 .999999996 18  
7 0 .999999994 18  
8 0 .999999996 18  
9 0 .999999996 18 Yes 
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Figure 7.4-6. Architectures Described in Table 7.4-2 
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7.5 Concluding Remarks 
There is merit in mapping the entire possible solution space.  By showing where similar classes 
of solutions fall within the entire set, it allows one to see ‘and how certain solution features effect 
FOM performance and derive architecture ‘rules of thumb’.  It also allows one to see the optimal 
solution boundary (the Pareto Front) and understand how one FOM can be exchanged for 
another.  
 
This approach provides insight into a potential limitation of the ‘Minimum 
Functionality/Minimum Implementation’ system architecting methodology [ref.6] which uses as 
its starting point a single-string non-redundant system architecture which lies somewhere in the 
interior of the solution trade space. The method involves performing one trade at a time to 
improve system safety until the mass margin is gone. It is not clear that this stepwise 
optimization of a single design can ever get to the boundary of optimal solutions (the Pareto 
Front).  Even if it somehow did reach the optimal boundary it is not clear the system architects 
will have access to and be able to visualize the whole range of optimal solutions. System 
architects using the ‘Minimum Functionality/Minimum Implementation’ approach should at least 
be aware that the technique described in this report is available and they should consider using it 
to explore the entire system trade space and to provide some comparative outputs for cross-check 
their results.   
   
With some enhancements the systematic GN&C/Avionics “building block” OPN modeling 
techniques employed by the MIT/Draper Laboratory would serve as an excellent tool for 
evaluating competing GN&C system architectures for future NASA spacecraft.  This OPN-based 
approach, or other similar modeling tools, would perform the extremely useful up-front function 
of identifying the most attractive (lowest weight and overall “cost”) GN&C architectural options 
that satisfy a prescribed set of spacecraft fault tolerance, reliability and performance 
requirements.  Although less likely, but worth observing, is the fact that such “building block” 
models could be used to identify the optimal highest reliability/lowest weight architectural 
options for a prescribed number and configuration of connections between adjacent GN&C 
components.  
 
On-board GN&C flight software was, by design, not included in this GN&C system modeling 
and analysis study. Since there are potential for achieving flight software commonalty across 
multiple spacecraft this aspect of the system architecture should be considered in future work.   
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8.0 Findings and NESC Recommendations 
8.1 Findings 
The following NESC/MIT/Draper Laboratory study team findings were identified: 
 
F-1.  Most optimal architectures can be created by using the lowest reliability and lightest 
components.  
 The analysis of the identified optimal architectures show that it is possible to produce 
nearly all potentially optimal architectures using only the Type A light weight/low-
reliability Sensors, Type A light weight/low-reliability computers, and generic 
connections.  
 
F-2. It is preferable to increase the redundancy of lighter, less reliable components rather than 
to use smaller numbers of more reliable, heavy components. 
 
F-3.  There are diminishing returns to adding redundancy, connections, or components with 
greater reliability.   
 The system will experience only minimal increases in overall reliability for the large 
gains in system weight.   
 
F-4.  For the optimal architectures in each scenario, the number of connections drops 
dramatically as the connection weight penalty is increased. 
 
F-5.  The impact of the dissimilar components penalty is more subtle than that for connectors, 
but is still apparent.   
 Some architectures containing both Computer Type A and Computer Type B were 
identified as potentially optimal when the penalty = 0.  However, when the penalty is 
increased to = 6, these architectures no longer appear to be better than other 
architectures. 
 
F-6.  The OPN-based modeling approach employed required a time-consuming manual 
process for eliminating architectural duplicates.   
 
F-7.  The OPN-based modeling approach employed was top-level only.  
 
F-8. In addition to the reliability metric, the existing OPN model could be modified  to 
identify the optimal GN&C /Avionics architectural options for satisfying other driving 
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system metrics, such as fault tolerance constraints, avionics power consumption, and/or 
attitude control performance.  
 
8.2 NESC Recommendations 
The following NESC recommendations were identified and directed to the ESMD 
Chief Engineer, the CxP Program System Engineering organization, and the Orion and Altair 
GN&C/Avionics Subsystem designers: 
 
R-1. Consider the fundamental findings of the NESC/MIT/Draper Laboratory study team to 
determine, given their reliability modeling assumptions, if the trends identified can be 
applied to architecting future CxP spacecraft GN&C/Avionics subsystems.  
(F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, and F-5) 
 
 R-2. Com prehensively investigate, using the OPN-based model described in this report (or 
using similar GN&C/Avionics modeling tools and methods) both the pros and cons of 
incorporating dissimilar GN&C Sensor, Computer, and Actuator components in the 
GN&C architectures.  Study how a small set of crew/flight safety critical GN&C 
functions can be synthesized/implemented in a backup manner with a limited 
complement of dissimilar hardware and software components.  (F-5)  
 
R-3.  Future work in on reliable GN&C should include the following enhancements of the 
GN&C/Avionics system modeling approach (F-6, F-7, F-8, and F-9):   
a) Improve the efficiency of the OPN model processing and its memory 
management. 
b) Incorporate provisions to model more than three Types of GN&C Sensors, 
Computers, and Actuators into the model. 
c) Include additional intrinsic descriptive details for each component beyond 
reliability and weight. 
d) Support expanded GN&C/Avionics architectural layouts in which the component 
redundancy for any component can be greater than three.  For example the 
enhanced model should be capable of evaluating an architecture consisting of four 
Sensors, three Computers, and two Actuators. 
e) Automate the process for eliminating architectural duplicates and for creating 
rules.  
R-4.  Future work on reliable GN&C should include the addition of the following metrics for 
higher-fidelity analysis and evaluation of GN&C/Avionics system architectural 
robustness, reliability, mass, power, volume, and performance (F-9):   
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a) The fault tolerance requirements/rules for the specific spacecraft application being 
modeled.  Metrics on the cost of any analytical redundancy (i.e., the redundancy 
management software) needed to detect and isolate faults should be provided for 
evaluation.      
b) The impact of common mode hardware failures. The metric could be either the 
incremental benefit of dissimilar redundancy or the incremental risk of similar 
redundancy.  
c) The values for Sensor, Computer, and Actuator component Mass, Volume, and 
Power (MVP). 
d) The 6-DOF spacecraft attitude and position control/knowledge performance 
metrics.   
 
9.0 Alternat e Viewpoints 
There were no alternate viewpoints or minority opinions expressed by the members of the 
NESC/MIT/Draper Laboratory study team.   
10.0 Other  Deliverables 
There are no other deliverables at this time. 
11.0 Lessons Learned 
There were no lessons learned. 
 
12.0 Definition of Terms   
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
 
Finding A conclusion based on facts established by the investigating authority.  
 
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap 
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed 
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; 
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision 
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that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.  
 
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment that did 
not contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected has the potential to 
cause a mishap, injury, or increase the severity should a mishap occur.  
Alternatively, an observation could be a positive acknowledgement of a 
Center/Program/Project/Organization’s operational structure, tools, and/or 
support provided. 
 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection. 
 
Proximate Cause  The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its 
occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. 
 
Recommendation An action identified by the assessment team to correct a root cause or 
deficiency identified during the investigation.  The recommendations may 
be used by the responsible Center/Program/Project/Organization in the 
preparation of a corrective action plan.  
 
Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired 
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome.  Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an 
undesired outcome. 
13.0 Acronyms List 
CaLV  Cargo Launch Vehicle 
CE&R  Concept Exploration and Refinement  
CEV  Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CLV  Crew Launch Vehicle 
Cx  Constellation 
CxP  Constellation Program 
DOF  Degree of Freedom 
EDS  Earth Departure Stage 
ESMD  Exploration Systems Mission Directorate  
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FOM  Figure of Merit 
IMU  Inertial Measurement Unit 
JSC  Johnson Space Center 
LaRC  Langley Research Center 
LSAM  Lunar Surface Access Module 
MTBF  Mean Time Between Failure 
MVP  Mass, Volume and Power  
NESC   NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NRB  NESC Review Board 
TDT  Technical Disciple Team  
TIM  Technical Interchange Meeting 
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Appendix A.  A Comparison of GN&C Architectural Approaches for 
Robotic and Human-Rated Spacecraft 
(A copy of this report is available through AIAA)
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Appendix B. A Comparison of Fault-Tolerant GN&C System 
Architectures Using the Object Process Network (OPN) Modeling 
Language
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